India china war 1962

INDO SINO WAR 1962

Indian Army holds the unique distinction of being one in all the world’s best in defending its country’s borders. However, the Indo-China war of 1962 goes down in our history books as a blot on the reputation of our forces and also the country. aside from that debacle, there's no plant disease on the face of our militia. the reason for defeat wasn’t lack of courage of our soldiers but was the destructive policies and spineless attitude of our political leaders of that time. Here are top reasons why India lost the 1962 war against China.

1. Communist connections:

It might appear to be controversial, but truth is often bitter. Political leaders including Leftists and so home minister Krishna Menon were all liable for playing down the threat from China’s side because of their inclination toward Communist ideology. However, As soon as the war began, even USSR desolated India to fight the war on its own resources.

2. Rubbishing of General Thorat’s warning reports:

General Thorat from the Indian Army had prepared and submitted a report back to the house ministry warning the political leadership of a way anticipated aggression from China’s side, but was ignored immediately by our political masters. Had the warnings been taken into stride on time, an oversized number of casualties and an enormous defeat could are prevented.

3. Attack on all fronts:

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched an attack on all fronts simultaneously encircling India in its nettrap when our leadership was sitting in Delhi discussing unyielding policies. India was attacked on the wee hours on October 20, 1962 in Ladakh, northern Uttarakhand and NEFA (presently Arunachal Pradesh) at the identical and caught us unawares and ill-prepared to react on time.

4. Weak generalship at the sector level:

As per the post war reports prepared by the commission to appear into the premier reasons for India’s shameful defeat at the hands of China, the military leadership was equally to be blamed for the rout. Chief of Army Staff and Chief of staff of the time were penned down as ‘guilty’ within the report. They were accused of playing down on true for an extended time.

5. Over-trust on China:

“Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai” was the quality diplomatic line that enjoyed unfounded importance by the state machinery within the late 1950’s and early 1960’s from Nehru and INC. Though, silent are the explanations for sudden development of such a high-level of trust on Chinese, it could only be described as mere foolishness on the a part of India. This over affectionate stance of India towards China spelled doom for the previous.

6. Provocation by India:

Post war reports say that it had been India who provoked the Chinese army with their offensive action despite being cognizant of the very fact that we lacked proper preparation and were ill-equipped for any war. Once China did away with its Taiwan plans, it worked in a very greater thanks to fill the loopholes present in its security. However, India was unaware of the developments. But the fireplace was lit after an alleged provocative statement from  Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru irked commie.

7. No use of IAF:

Something that went overhead for nearly all the defense experts of the time was why was the Indian Air Force (IAF) not allowed to hold out an attack on the enemy. Their function was only limited to dropping food supplies to the Indian Army. However, had IAF been employed for a more inclusive role, things could are vastly different considering the actual fact that our Air Force was superior to China’s at the time.

8. Logistical failure:

It is widely believed that the Indian Army ran out of food, artillery and ammunition supplies during the war. The backup was weak and therefore the established order was maintained for considerable time span that resulted in further weakening of Indian grip on the border area. Therefore, logistical failure could even have been a important reason for the debacle.

9. Weak leadership:

The political leadership of the country was too weak and inefficient. Nehru depended an excessive amount of on the discretion and words of Krishna Menon. the result was evident; India had to bite dust and lost numerous soldiers on the war ground front for the only reason of lacking top leadership potential of the country.

10. Unprepared army:

Indian Army has always been invincible and particularly in our backyards were next to God in self defense, to place it more precisely. However, in absence of proper strategy and advanced weapons the defeat was playing on the cards. This damaged the morale of our troops and also led to a dejection within the hearts of many countrymen who had never dreamt of such a humiliating defeat.

              India was the aggressor initially before the Chinese decided to form it into a war.                      We prefer to give some thought to our Army as defensive only, but the 1962                         war tells us that this changes with political leadership.

• Nehru was high on power and also the Army most in order that he didnt even prepare them for this war before asking to wage it. The Indian Army was grossly outnumbered on most of the forward posts (8:1) and very poorly equipped.
• 
  The Army fought a valiant battle though being outnumbered. it's a travesty that nobody in my generation has heard about Shaitan Singh and Pyara Singh. If the military had planned this out and with logistical support this war could easily have gone the opposite way.
• 
  The 1962 debacle taught the military of the importance of logistics and training high altitude warfare. This was partially accountable for the next wins against Pakistan.
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  The 1962 war was called out by Mao also as a method of consolidating power on the Communist Party. This had weakened because China experienced massive famines within the preceding decades due to Mao's poor policies.
• 
  For some reason India failed to resort to using accumulation. The Chinese although planned for a rapid thrust, weren't prepared to fight for long thanks to logistical issues. Had India used aggregation and continued the war, things could have changed differently.
• 
  The Chinese unilaterally announced cease fire after their initial rapid thrusts. This was also the time when the Indian Army were commencing to regroup and consolidate for a extended war. This cease fire was a masterstroke by Mao because it gave the Chinese a transparent victory rather than an uncertain prolonged war.
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  Nehru, shocked by the rapid Chinese thrusts into Indian territory, quickly accepted the cease fire. This cemented the Chinese victory quite the initial losses by the military.
  It seems as if the 1962 war lost not due to a superior Chinese army, but due to India's then poor strategic and political leadership. Not only was Nehru wrong about letting the military attend war without enough preparation and logistical support and hoping that they might still win it, he was also wrong about doubting their capability once they consolidated and quickly accepting the cease fire. 1962 wasn't lost on the battlefield, the maximum amount because it was lost within the mind.